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ABSTRACT: This field study research evaluates the viability of applying an option-based 
risk management (OBRiM) framework, and its accompanying theoretical perspective 
and methodology, to real-world sequential information technology (IT) investment 
problems. These problems involve alternative investment structures that bear different 
risk proﬁles for the ﬁrm, and also may improve the payoffs of the associated projects 
and the organization’s performance. We sought to surface the costs, beneﬁts, and risks 
associated with a complex sequential investment setting that has the key features that 
OBRiM treats. We combine traditional, purchased real options that subsequently create 
strategic ﬂexibility for the decision maker, with implicit or embedded real options that are 
available with no speciﬁc investment required provided the decision maker recognizes 
them. This combination helps the decision maker to both (1) explicitly surface all of his 
or her strategic choices and (2) accurately value those choices, including ones that re-
quire prior enabling investments. The latter permits senior managers to adjust a project’s 
investment trajectory in the face of revealed risk. This normally is important when there 
are uncertain organizational, technological, competitive, and market conditions. The 
context of our research is a data mart consolidation project, which was conducted by a 
major airline ﬁrm in association with a data warehousing systems vendor. Field study 
inquiry and data collection were essential elements in the retrospective analysis of the 
efﬁcacy of OBRiM as a means to control risk in a large-scale project. We learned that 
OBRiM’s main beneﬁts are (1) the ability to generate meaningful option-bearing invest-
ment structures, (2) simpliﬁcation of the complexities of real options for the business 
context, (3) accuracy in analyzing the risks of IT investments, and (4) support for more 
proactive planning. These issues, which we show are more effectively addressed by 
OBRiM than the other methods, have become crucial as more corporate ﬁnance-style 
approaches are applied to IT investment and IT services problems. Our evaluative study 
shows that OBRiM has the potential to add value for managers looking to structure 
risky IT investments, although some aspects still require reﬁnements. 
KEY WORDS AND PHRASES: data marts, data warehouses, investment valuation, IT invest-
ment, IT services, options, risk management, services science.
LARGE-SCALE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) investments, such as in enterprise systems 
and data warehousing systems, are high-risk, high-return endeavors that can create 
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strategic options. According to Clemons and Gu: “A strategic option represents a 
capability to deploy a selected strategy” [13, pp. 15–16]. A dilemma that many orga-
nizations face is how to structure such IT investments to optimally control risk and 
maximize value for the strategies they use. Some choices for this include one-shot 
implementation, staged implementation, or a pilot effort with a full-scale follow-up 
effort. Each requires careful consideration of the sequence of IT investment and 
implementation actions that are appropriate. 
We recently proposed an option-based risk management (OBRiM) framework to ad-
dress this issue [6]. OBRiM helps a decision maker to identify which real options (i.e., 
the implicit options of deferral and abandonment, and the explicit options of pilot and 
staging that involve some cost to purchase) can be used in an IT investment in order 
to manage risk and maximize value.1 OBRiM’s logic is that, given the risks speciﬁc 
to an IT investment and the related business setting, embedding carefully chosen real 
options builds the ﬂexibility needed in case the envisioned risks actually materialize, 
complementing the implicit options that managers always have at their disposal. Bena-
roch et al. [9] found that the informal IT risk management strategies of experienced IT 
project managers are consistent with OBRiM’s logic. The framework uses the tools 
of real options theory from ﬁnance to quantify the monetary consequences of risk, to 
measure ﬂexibility in terms of real option value, and to link these to net investment 
value. Often, more than one combination of real options may permit controlling the 
risks affecting an IT investment, consistent with a corporate ﬁnance perspective 
on the management of IT projects and infrastructure investments [1]. Because each 
combination usually has a different associated cost, OBRiM enables ﬁnding the most 
effective combinations of real options for controlling risk and maximizing investment 
value. Yet, despite these appealing elements of the framework, it remains to be seen 
whether OBRiM adds value in practice—or if its underlying intuition is enough to 
support effective decision making.
This paper uses a ﬁeld study methodology involving interviews with senior man-
agers, collection of data from multiple ﬁrms, and additional modeling and analysis 
to assess the viability of the OBRiM framework and its underlying theory in a real-
world setting. Among the questions we hoped to answer for academic research are: 
Does the framework produce sequential investment structures that managerial users 
ﬁnd adequate for controlling uncertainty in critical business settings? Is it feasible 
to estimate the inputs necessary to evaluate these investment structures using Monte 
Carlo simulations? Is the use of ﬁnancial real option models suitable for obtaining 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc IT investment valuations? What will be the reactions of business users 
to sensitivity analysis information that is obtained through Monte Carlo simulations 
with such models? And, can we understand how do and how should companies iden-
tify relevant growth options and estimate their parameters for their business settings? 
Gaining insight through these questions opens up the possibility for a new corporate 
ﬁnance and risk management tool set for IT senior managers.
This evaluative ﬁeld study of OBRiM was conducted in the context of a complex data 
mart consolidation (DMC) project aimed at producing an enterprise data warehouse.2 
The ﬁeld study was undertaken with the support of a leading data warehousing ven-
dor, Teradata (www.teradata.com),3 in cooperation with a major airline whose senior 
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management was considering such an investment.4 They were especially interested in 
structuring the investment to properly recognize the expected costs, beneﬁts, and risks 
the airline faced. Consolidating data marts enterprisewide is a large-scale IT invest-
ment. In 2001, almost all Fortune 1000 companies deployed or planned to deploy an 
enterprisewide data warehouse [48]. However, such projects are very risky: 50 percent 
to 67 percent of all initial efforts do not deliver the promised beneﬁts [49].
From a practitioner’s perspective, the methods used in this ﬁeld study research 
exemplify the new “services science” thinking. In this thinking, innovative tools, 
frameworks, and approaches are applied to yield actionable knowledge for the man-
agement of IT projects, investments, infrastructures, and services. For the present 
study, the data warehousing vendor’s problem was how to help its clients confront 
investment issues surrounding data mart and enterprise data warehousing projects. 
The primary applied questions that arose are: How can the long-term strategic value 
be best understood and portrayed via analysis methods that provide a basis for ap-
plication in similar contexts and that build upon well-accepted knowledge? How 
can the value of pursuing different implementation alternatives be understood from 
the perspective of real growth options they create? What theory-based methodology 
will enable the data warehousing vendor’s clients to evaluate the many alternative 
implementation choices as sequential IT investments? How should their trade-offs be 
characterized in terms of the different risks, rewards, and cost components? Is there 
a methodology for reducing the overwhelming aspects of implementation risk that 
such large-scale IT investments carry with them? In what ways is it possible to help 
the vendor’s clients understand and quantify the monetary consequences of risk and 
risk management strategies that can be achieved through innovative approaches to 
IT investment structuring?
From a researcher’s perspective, OBRiM is one of several approaches, including 
sequential statistical decision analysis, decision trees, and dynamic programming 
[13], that can be used to structure investments in order to control risk. Our ﬁeld study 
also seeks to reveal the advantages and disadvantages of OBRiM relative to these 
other approaches. The main critique that we offer is that other approaches (1) lack 
metrics for calibrating risk and (2) do not provide a structured approach that enables 
managers to identify plausible real operating and growth options. These issues have 
become crucial as more corporate ﬁnance-style approaches are applied to IT invest-
ment problems (e.g., [3, 18, 28, 32]).
A broader contribution of this paper is to demonstrate the potential of the OBRiM 
framework to bridge two main research camps on real options. One camp is high on 
rigor and the technical aspects of valuing investments using option pricing models. 
It often overlooks the complexities of applying real options to the kind of projects IT 
managers actually face (e.g., [46, 47]). The other is more strategy focused. Its concern 
is articulating managerial heuristics and reasoning processes based on the real options 
logic (e.g., [13, 20, 21, 36]). This camp recognizes the complexities of applying real 
options in practice. It typically offers no rigorous approach to conﬁguring the various 
real options that could be embedded in real projects. To bridge this gap, we show how 
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OBRiM can simplify the application of real options thinking to real-world IT invest-
ments while retaining the quantitative rigor of option pricing models.
Theory
REAL OPTIONS ANALYSIS OFFERS USEFUL theory and methods to address some of the issues 
that we discussed up to this point with respect to sequential large-scale IT investments. 
Much information systems (IS) research on real options originally focused on the 
evaluation of risky IT investments using real options analysis methods from ﬁnancial 
economics. Usually, these methods are applied to IT investments that are subject to 
known risks. These methods also assume that some embedded real options already 
provide management with strategic and operational ﬂexibility needed to respond to 
the risks. Real option models have been effectively used to quantify the net value that 
the ﬂexibility adds in relation to the risks. See Table 1 for sample studies that use this 
approach and its recent variations.
In spite of the potential beneﬁts that we have suggested, Clemons and Gu note a 
number of drawbacks on how real options analysis is often applied:
Valuation of ﬁnancial options requires existence of arbitrage-free markets where 
the underlying assets are traded. . . . In its purest sense, a real option is the right to 
trade a physical asset. . . . There exist no arbitrage-free markets where underlying 
assets are traded. . . . Even were such assets to exist, this would fail to capture 
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc valuation essential to real options theory. . . . Signiﬁcantly, real 
options theory, in fact, does not dictate use of any particular pricing models. It 
is simply an approach that recognizes the value of management ﬂexibility in 
investment evaluation. [13, pp. 14–15]5
The methods permit modeling uncertainties and alternative contexts in terms of 
distributions. This avoids the limitations of scenario analysis, which has its own 
strengths as a qualitative method for IT investment evaluation. This point becomes 
apparent when we apply methods such as Monte Carlo simulations to generate power-
ful sensitivity analysis information that is lacking in other approaches. In the research 
context discussed in this paper, we are able to treat a key question of interest. Can 
Monte Carlo simulations produce sensitivity analysis information that managerial 
users will ﬁnd useful, in association with methods that permit the control of risk in 
large-scale sequential IT investments?
More recent IS research looks at the link between different risks and different types 
of real options. Kim and Sanders [30] explain how real options can proactively help 
us to understand risk in IT projects and to justify project management decisions. This 
work looks only at three types of options (defer, abandon, change scale), however, 
and does not focus on any speciﬁc list of risks. The OBRiM framework [6] that we 
advocate, in contrast, offers a more comprehensive and direct way to link the manage-
ment of various IT investment risks with the use of different real options.
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The theoretical perspective underlying the OBRiM framework is as follows. To 
maximize IT investment value, a good manager must size up the relevant risks and 
proactively build ﬂexibility into an investment. The manager then should continually 
evaluate new information about the risks, and take corrective actions within the bounds 
of the ﬂexibility built into the investment—both in explicit option and in implicit 
option terms. OBRiM formalizes this perspective based on real options theory. It aids 
in ﬁnding a combination of real options or forms of ﬂexibility that add the most value 
relative to the risks speciﬁc to an IT investment. Its main tenets are:
• Real options can be interpreted as high-level strategies for managing risk, with 
the associated strategic action and a managerial decision that is made possible 
[1]. Some options are risk mitigation strategies, for example, prototyping as a 
partial investment, which requires some investment up front. Project abandonment 
is similar; however, it always is available to a management decision maker, so 
long as there is an active project strategy. From this point of view, both deferral 
and abandonment have a strategy aspect and a decision aspect. Real options also 
create ﬂexibility needed to deploy more granular risk mitigation steps contingent 
on the occurrence of risk. For example, deferral can reduce risk due to restrictive 
regulation with time to lobby for a change in legislation [8]. Similarly, a pilot 
prototype can prepare a ﬁrm for greater commitment later in the face of market 
uncertainty.
• Flexibility must be proactively embedded in an IT investment based on the 
speciﬁc risks one seeks to control. OBRiM proposes a set of risk option map-
pings prescribing which real options to embed for which speciﬁc IT risks [6, 9]. 
For example, to control risk due to project size and complexity, the mappings 
recommend using the stage, explore (pilot prototype), lease, and outsource real 
options, but not the defer and exit real options.
• The real options mapped to for the risks present permit generating alternative 
investment conﬁgurations [6]. Each conﬁguration embeds a different combina-
tion of these real options.
• Different combinations of real options affect IT investment value differently, 
because each may control the same risks to varying degrees and each may have 
a different associated cost. An economically superior conﬁguration can be found 
by quantitatively evaluating the different investment conﬁgurations using option 
pricing models.
In order to optimize the balance between risk and value, while considering the cost 
of creating real options, OBRiM prescribes four analysis steps built on top of the “base 
case” analysis developed for an IT investment (see Figure 1).
These steps enable senior managers to conﬁgure an IT investment using the most 
cost-effective combination of real options designed for that investment. In comparison 
to other approaches that can be used to structure investments in order to control risk 
and create strategic options for the ﬁrm, OBRiM is tuned for the systematic generation 
of alternative investment structures. In this way, it may result in the generation of more 
alternatives. This, however, can present a trade-off, depending on who is evaluating 
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this capability. On one hand, the ability to support the risk management–driven gen-
eration of alternative strategies and conﬁgurations for an IT investment is certainly 
an advantage. It will help decision makers to surface opportunities that they might 
not otherwise have thought of. On the other hand, for strategy-oriented investment 
planning, more alternatives can be a drawback, in the sense of “analysis clutter” and 
mistaken reliance on a tool to substitute for careful managerial evaluation of strategic 
opportunities. The onus still is on the shoulders of the users to interpret the usefulness 
of the real options that are surfaced.
To conclude our discussion in this section, we offer the reader a generalization of 
our representation of OBRiM. Figure 2 shows the relationships among the major 
analysis steps that are more generally appropriate for structuring sequential IT invest-
ments so as to control their risk and maximize their value. Figure 2 has a number of 
main elements and subelements, as we have suggested in various ways through our 
discussion. One is the assessment of the base case investment without real options, 
resulting in the passive net present value.6 This element also includes risk assess-
ment and sensitivity analysis. The second main element is an assessment of alterna-
tive IT investment conﬁgurations, and the active net present value that results for 
each alternative. This is done in terms of generation of alternative structures for the 
various proposed sequential investment actions, risk estimation, and valuation of the 
real option–bearing investment conﬁgurations. The ﬁnal part involves identiﬁcation 
of a superior investment conﬁguration and sensitivity analysis for examining that 
conﬁguration’s ability to control risk.
Figure 1. The OBRiM Framework
112   BENAROCH, JEFFERY, KAUFFMAN, AND SHAH
F
ig
ur
e 
2.
 A
 R
oa
d 
M
ap
 f
or
 th
e 
A
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
In
vo
lv
ed
 in
 I
T
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t S
tr
uc
tu
ri
ng
 f
or
 R
is
k 
C
on
tr
ol
N
ot
es
: 
T
he
 tw
o 
in
st
an
ce
s 
w
he
re
 s
en
si
ti
vi
ty
 a
na
ly
si
s 
is
 u
se
d 
ha
ve
 d
if
fe
re
nt
 o
bj
ec
ti
ve
s.
 T
he
 o
ne
 in
 th
e 
ba
se
 c
as
e 
an
al
ys
is
 e
xa
m
in
es
 th
e 
pa
ss
iv
e 
ne
t p
re
se
nt
 v
al
ue
 (
N
PV
).
 T
he
 o
th
er
 e
xa
m
in
es
 th
e 
ac
ti
ve
 N
PV
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t c
on
ﬁg
ur
at
io
ns
 e
m
be
dd
in
g 
op
ti
on
s.
 A
lt
ho
ug
h 
th
e 
la
tte
r 
ca
n 
be
 a
pp
lie
d 
to
 e
ve
ry
 p
la
us
ib
le
 in
ve
st
m
en
t c
on
ﬁg
ur
at
io
n,
 th
e 
ro
ad
 m
ap
 a
ss
um
es
 it
 w
il
l b
e 
ap
pl
ie
d 
on
ly
 to
 th
e 
co
nﬁ
gu
ra
ti
on
 
w
ith
 th
e 
hi
gh
es
t a
ct
iv
e 
N
PV
 f
or
 r
ea
so
ns
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ov
er
lo
ad
.
OPTION-BASED RISK MANAGEMENT     113
OBRiM Applied in a Sequential IT Investment Setting
HOW SHOULD DATA MART CONSOLIDATION PROJECTS be structured to maximize value? How 
can the OBRiM framework contribute to our understanding of how to effectively 
control risk in such large IT investment settings? What speciﬁc aspects of OBRiM 
effectively support the analysis and the management of risk of consolidating data marts 
as an instance of a typical sequential IT investment? To answer these questions, we 
will apply OBRiM to a real-world project and assess each of OBRiM’s steps (seen in 
Figure 1) in terms of its value, weaknesses, and challenges for research and practice. 
The Appendix offers a review of the main issues involved.
Step 1: Business Discovery and Context
The data used in our ﬁeld study were provided by the data warehouse vendor, Teradata, 
for one of its client’s data mart consolidation project. The vendor’s client is a large 
airline ﬁrm, Global Airline. The cost and payoff ﬁgures underlying our analysis have 
been scaled so they are unrecognizable and protect the airline’s identity.
Figure 3 shows the airline ﬁrm’s existing “baseline” data marts. They fall into four 
clusters, based on a similarity of their technology platform (e.g., Oracle) or relatedness 
of their business functions (e.g., ﬁnancial and route tracking optimization). Another 
vendor’s operational customer relationship management (CRM) solution offering 
campaign management capabilities was deployed earlier with a stand-alone data mart 
with no ﬁrmwide views.
The airline ﬁrm hoped to consolidate ten existing data marts and enhance its CRM 
capabilities. Senior managers recognized that a data mart consolidation would have 
several beneﬁts. It could lower the cost of operating data marts. It could lower IT 
expenditures using a data platform from a single vendor. It also might produce bet-
ter-quality data and a more robust data management platform. Finally, it would likely 
create follow-up investment opportunities in an integrated CRM solution, which 
managers identiﬁed as the only plausible one in the foreseeable future. Other follow-
up investment opportunities not considered include supply-chain applications and 
business intelligence, for example. As such, it would not make sense to exclude soft 
beneﬁts such as performance gains due to improved decision-making capabilities that 
are outside the scope of CRM.
The data warehousing vendor was called upon by its airline ﬁrm client to build a 
business case to enable an accept–reject investment decision, and to conﬁgure the 
investment in light of the expected costs, beneﬁts, and risks. The vendor’s staff invited 
the authors, via Northwestern University, to apply OBRiM, which offered us a useful 
means to test it.
Step 2: Base Case Analysis
Following the steps in Figure 1, we develop a base case for our analysis. Because 
we want to evaluate various ways to achieve two separate goals for our data mart 
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Figure 3. Global Airline’s Data Mart Environment
consolidation analysis—rehosting and rearchitecting (see the Appendix)—we actu-
ally consider two base cases. These base cases involve no use of real options for risk 
management purposes.
• Base Case 1: Rehosting all data marts at once. This involves simply migrating all 
ten of the airline’s data marts into a single, integrated enterprise data warehouse. 
The upside of this “big bang” approach was viewed as earlier cost savings from 
substantial IT personnel reductions and scale economies. The downside was 
committing to doing everything at once. A rehosted-only environment will not 
allow the current operational CRM solution to yield any new beneﬁts. But adding 
the data warehousing vendor’s integrated analytic CRM solution will produce 
some beneﬁts through new capabilities, including event-based marketing.
• Base Case 2: Rehosting and rearchitecting all data marts at once. Compared to 
Base Case 1, this also involves developing a uniﬁed data model for all data marts 
and reengineering the data before they are migrated into the data warehouse. To 
the data warehousing vendor’s project team, rehosting and rearchitecting all data 
marts simultaneously was an unrealistic strategic choice. Instead, rearchitecting 
data mart clusters that closely bind together and share common attributes (e.g., 
Clusters III and IV in Figure 3), in an appropriate sequence, was viewed as being 
capable of improving data quality and yielding higher CRM payoffs. However, 
no “stage-gate” reviews were to be included that would give ﬂexibility to adjust 
the investment trajectory. As such, committing to a full rearchitecting effort was 
also viewed as adding to risk, though it would lower the vendor’s professional IT 
services costs due to efﬁciency and scale economies. Moreover, it was viewed 
as adding nothing to the beneﬁts of the current CRM solution. It was felt that 
rearchitecting would add much value only if an integrated CRM solution were 
deployed later.
Financial analysis indicates that the expected net present value (NPV) for both base 
cases is positive and signiﬁcant. The expected NPV for Base Case 1 is $551,685 and 
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for Base Case 2 it is $645,715. If the integrated CRM solution is added, the expected 
NPVs jump to $1,006,983 for Base Case 1 and to $3,574,488 for Base Case 2. Both 
are sufﬁciently high—in fact, one doubles the projected NPV while the other multi-
plies NPV by ﬁve—so that managers could appropriately make a “go” decision for 
each in isolation from the other. With the larger return on the combined rehosting and 
rearchitecting approach, though, this will be the preferred action.
Committing to full implementation despite uncertainty over the ability to realize 
expected beneﬁts means that risk is high in both cases.7 To better appreciate the issue 
of risk, we can look at the sensitivity analysis results for Step 7 (see Figure 1). These 
results are obtained by identifying the risk factors involved and using Monte Carlo 
simulations to examine their impact on expected outcomes. Figure 4 shows the NPV 
distributions derived for the base cases with and without the analytic CRM solution 
added. All distributions show signiﬁcant variability, with internal rates of return (IRR) 
ranging between –60 percent and +90 percent as well as a 20 percent to 42 percent 
chance that the NPVs will be negative. The ﬁgures are encouraging only for Base Case 
2 with the analytic CRM deployed, with IRR between –60 percent and +130 percent. 
This does not meet the high expectation executives have from an investment that could 
cost over $10 million and involve considerable organizational change [37].
We can improve on the base cases by adding ﬂexibility to the investment to permit 
better management of risk. One conﬁguration could involve a two-stage project. One 
data mart cluster would be consolidated in the ﬁrst stage, after which a stage-gate 
Figure 4. NPV Distributions for the Base Cases
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review would determine how much risk was resolved (e.g., extent of IT personnel 
reduction in actuality) and permit a better decision on whether to proceed with the 
remaining data mart clusters. This incremental approach creates a real option by re-
quiring only a partial investment. However, the downside includes higher costs due to 
lost economies of scale and postponed cost savings. Other, more beneﬁcial conﬁgura-
tions are possible, pointing to the overall conclusion that the data mart consolidation 
investment should be conﬁgured to permit optimal management of risk and maximum 
value. The OBRiM framework answers this by identifying the real options (staging, 
pilot, abandon) to embed in the investment.
Step 3: Risk Analysis
OBRiM identiﬁes risk factors or traits of the investment or its environment that can 
cause the project to stray from the planned trajectory and expectations. Table 2 shows 
OBRiM’s generic IT investment risk factors (second column) and the related risk 
factors for data mart consolidation projects (third column).
The risk factors that we found to be relevant at our ﬁeld study research sites are poor-
quality data, low end-user participation, lack of senior management support, changes 
in end-user skill requirements, and slow user adoption [53]. There are other possible 
risk factors that were not explicitly mentioned by the data warehousing vendor’s staff. 
They include lack of enterprise data warehousing skills and experience, the complex-
ity of doing any rehosting or rearchitecting development on a “big bang” basis, high 
end-user utilization, and lack of technology for development [53]. Figure 5 shows 
an inﬂuence diagram tracing back from three outcome variables—implementation 
cost, immediate payoffs from data mart consolidation, and future CRM beneﬁts—to 
uncertain input variables corresponding to OBRiM’s IT risk factors.
Step 4: Identifying Real Options to Embed
In Table 2 in the right columns, we apply a subset of OBRiM’s risk option mappings 
to the data mart consolidation risks identiﬁed for the airline ﬁrm. Each of the table 
entries can be thought of as a named action or a named strategy that involves execut-
ing an option with the same name. Some of these options were purchased by the ﬁrm 
and are explicit (e.g., to learn more by constructing a pilot prototype). The cost of 
other options may be implicit (e.g., deferring implementation defers the beneﬁts that 
are realized, reducing the discounted cash ﬂow). In either case, the strategic decision 
involves executing an option, with implicit or explicit costs. This results in an exercised 
option. We also marked certain real options as nonviable. Viability was determined 
based on whether the necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the real option to exist 
[6] are met by the airline ﬁrm’s investment assumptions. Some additional reasons for 
the risk option mappings are:
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Figure 5. Inﬂuence Diagram for Global Airline’s Data Mart Project
• The real option to defer the project or one of its parts is not viable. No new 
information that would help resolve any risk is expected to arrive over time in 
this particular setting.8
• The real option to stage (stop–resume) or to gradually consolidate data mart 
clusters is viable. It permits stopping implementation in midstream.
• The real option to prototype aspects of the project is not viable. For consolida-
tion of data marts to be effective, it must create a fully working enterprise data 
warehouse.
• The real option to pilot the project on a small scale is viable. This is a varia-
tion of the stage option that involves only a pilot stage and full-scale follow-up 
implementation stage.
• The real option to exit (switch–use) during implementation or after the enterprise 
data warehouse becomes operational is not viable. No project resources can be 
released for more valuable uses.
• The real option to change scale only allows reducing the project scope (fewer 
data marts, no rearchitecting). The initial project scope already covers all data 
mart clusters the airline ﬁrm is seeking to consolidate.
• The real option to lease implementation hardware and software resources is not 
viable. Once a data mart is consolidated, only the ﬁnished product is available.
• The real option to outsource implementation is viable but already exercised. 
The airline ﬁrm has already decided to outsource the project, in part, to transfer 
risks to the data warehousing vendor. These arise from the airline’s lack of data 
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mart development skills and enterprise data warehousing development methods. 
Another reason is the project’s complexity.
• One growth option is a follow-on investment in an integrated analytic CRM 
solution. It is viable if the high end-user utilization materializes.
Step 5: Choosing Investment Conﬁgurations
This step designs investment conﬁgurations using subsets of the viable real options 
identiﬁed (pilot, stage, contract, and growth). Many different investment conﬁgurations 
can be designed, but the number of conﬁgurations worth considering is much smaller. 
Here, a good understanding of the business environment helps to rule out many im-
plausible or inferior conﬁgurations before any quantitative valuation is conducted.
In the airline ﬁrm’s case, the conﬁgurations we designed are governed by context-
related assumptions and other assumptions about the viable options and their combi-
nations. Some illustrations follow:
• If the data mart consolidation project is to be staged, each stage would include 
the data marts in at least one cluster.
• Independent of which conﬁguration is pursued, if an integrated analytic CRM 
is used, its implementation would occur immediately after.
• If the project is staged, the rearchitecting of data mart Clusters III and IV would 
be bundled together—even if cost savings get delayed.
• The data mart consolidation staging option permits midstream shutdown, without 
affecting existing or consolidated data marts.
• The option to pilot involves consolidating m out of n data marts (m < n). This could 
be followed by a one-shot consolidation of the remaining n–m data marts.
• For the stage and pilot options, the airline ﬁrm can incrementally acquire hard-
ware and software resources via enterprise data warehouse “nodes” [42, 43].
• The option to contract is viable only in combination with the stage and pilot 
options. With the stage option, contraction would limit data mart consolidation 
to only rehosting. With the pilot option, contraction would limit the full-scale 
implementation stage to only rehosting or to fewer data marts.
• The growth option includes only the integrated analytic CRM prospect, whose 
deployment has a higher value on a rearchitected environment.
Step 6: Real Options Valuation
We next calculate the active NPV for each investment conﬁguration, to ﬁnd the one 
that maximizes value. This requires computing for each conﬁguration the value that 
embedded real options add to the passive NPV. For this ﬁeld study of the data ware-
housing vendor and the airline ﬁrm, we use a multi-option nested binomial pricing 
model that Benaroch et al. [10] adapted to ﬁt traits of the options involved. These 
traits are as follows. Each real option has an underlying asset equaling the incremental 
cash ﬂows plus the future options its exercise generates. The real options are sequen-
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tial and do not overlap in time, as may be expected in most real-world sequential IT 
investment projects. The real options are European because of budget cycle issues. 
The parameters the model requires are the underlying asset value, the exercise price, 
time to maturity, and the volatility of the underlying asset. The ﬁrst three are estimated 
based on data used for the base cases. Estimating volatility requires additional work, 
which we discuss next.
An important question remains though: What leads us to believe that these models 
can capture ﬁrm-speciﬁc valuations? The answer we seek to verify is that the value of 
real options is determined by both the model and the parameters that the model uses. 
There are three elements to this argument—two relate to risk estimation and the last 
relates to estimation of growth options. First, the way risk factors are (and should be) 
estimated must reﬂect ﬁrm-speciﬁc perceptions of those risks. If two ﬁrms estimate 
risks differently, then the option valuations will be different. On this premise, one of 
our subgoals is to determine how doable it is to develop ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk estimates. 
This issue can be linked to the risk estimation challenge we discuss a little later. In 
particular, for the airline ﬁrm’s IT investment, some risk factors were estimated sub-
jectively by the ﬁrm’s executives, whereas others were estimated based on external 
benchmarks from the data warehousing vendor.
Subjective estimates are more consistent with ﬁrm-speciﬁc valuations, but they are 
subject to biases. Estimates based on the vendor’s benchmarks are less subjective, but 
they move away from ﬁrm-speciﬁc valuations. We know how this works in practice 
from other research on computer-aided software engineering that we conducted in 
the past [3, 4]. Similar issues arose with respect to estimates of the cost of building 
large-scale infrastructure systems for investment banking and brokerage services. In 
general, two different customers who are involved in consulting with an outsourcing 
vendor are likely to end up with valuations that are formulated on a similar basis, due 
to the high one-time cost of building a baseline model to support further analysis work. 
At the same time, benchmark-based estimates are likely to be more reliable and less 
biased than subjective estimates, and are subject to improvements over time with use 
and experience on the part of the vendor.
Another parameter we feed into conventional option valuation models is the risk-free 
interest rate, and it plays a role in ﬁrm-speciﬁc project valuation in many investment 
contexts. We know this is problematic because it is geared toward market-driven, not 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc, valuations. The risk-free rate, for example, fails to capture the degree 
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, as does weighted average cost of capital. The latter calibrates 
project risk relative to the next dollar of project investment for the ﬁrm as a whole, 
rather than for the project in isolation.
A ﬁnal parameter used in conventional option valuation models is the estimation 
of soft beneﬁts and growth options—two additional considerations that will affect 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc valuations. It is interesting in this context to see the extent to which the 
“digital options for IT strategy” message has been picked up by the business press 
and business school faculty [38]. In spite of the attention given to these ideas, and 
the emphasis that has been placed on the “reconceptualization” of the role of IT re-
sources, there still is no foolproof approach to valuing IT and organizational ﬂexibility 
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in relation to future contingent strategies. As far as we can tell, most authors in the 
literature view this as being in the realm of subjective evaluation by managers, and, 
for that reason, they do not tend to challenge it or dwell on it (e.g., [7, 8, 13, 14, 18]). 
Instead, the main point of view that has been expressed is related to the appropriate-
ness of the conceptual thinking that goes along with ﬁrm-speciﬁc valuation via real 
options, and the intuition associated with valuation under uncertainty with information 
revelation occurring over time. In contrast, however, the estimation of volatility for 
real option–related cash ﬂows seems much better understood, including in ways that 
rely upon historical information to calibrate them.
Volatility Estimation
We estimated the volatility for each individual real option i in data mart consolidation 
conﬁguration j corresponding to a speciﬁc consolidation stage (which generates its 
own incremental cash ﬂows), σ
i,j
DMC. We did the same for the growth option correspond-
ing to CRM deployment in conﬁguration j, σ
j
CRM. Volatility here may be seen as the 
aggregate contribution of every risk factor to the variability of cash ﬂows, assuming 
uncorrelated risk factors.
We estimated σ
i,j
DMC by running Monte Carlo simulations for each real option in 
each conﬁguration. The risk factors contributing to σ
i,j
DMC are IT management and IT 
personnel resistance, quality of data sources, and end-user participation (see Figure 
5). Because IT management and IT personnel resistance inﬂuence only IT personnel 
reduction, their impact on volatility is directly reﬂected in the distribution of the latter. 
Brainstorming sessions with managers were revealing. They believed IT personnel 
reduction would follow a normal probability distribution. This resulted in the mean and 
variance parameters of the distribution for the stafﬁng requirements for a consolidated 
enterprise data warehouse. They agreed to truncate the distribution because they knew 
there would be minimum and maximum IT personnel reductions.
Both quality of data sources and user participation directly inﬂuence implementation 
schedule. Volatility due to quality of data sources was estimated based on a proprietary 
scheme from the data warehousing vendor. This variable is normally distributed, 
with the distribution parameters depending on data mart age, platforms used (Oracle, 
IBM, etc.), the number of IT staff operating them, and the types of interfaces with 
applications they serve, among others. The variability of end-user participation dur-
ing rearchitecting is also assumed to be normally distributed. It is estimated using a 
proprietary tool that the data warehousing vendor uses to measure its client’s degree 
of customer-centricity. (We elaborate on this below.) Given the normal distributions 
of these variables, we assume a linear and additive relationship between them and the 
implementation schedule variable.
To estimate σ
j
DMC, also with a Monte Carlo simulation, we consider how the data 
warehousing vendor uses a key metric for the client. The degree of customer-centricity 
is a predictor of three risk factors affecting CRM implementation: end-user partici-
pation, which also affects rearchitecting; cultural, organizational, and end-user skill 
changes affecting customer-facing employees; and end-user adoption. A base degree 
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of customer-centricity case for a client is developed by assessing its current CRM 
practices along three dimensions—proﬁling and segmentation, critical event manage-
ment, and retention and loyalty programs. Customer-centricity on each dimension is 
measured using a ﬁve-level scale—foundation, intermediate, advanced, leading edge, 
and breakthrough. This assessment shows “where the client is” and “where the cli-
ent could go” with an integrated analytic CRM solution. Our ﬁeld study interviews 
suggested that the airline ﬁrm was in the “intermediate” level for “proﬁling and 
segmentation” and “retention and loyalty,” and in the “foundation” level for “critical 
event management.”
Based on the performance improvement experienced by a benchmark set of clients 
who already adopted the data warehousing vendor’s analytic CRM solution, the variance 
of the airline ﬁrm’s improvement potential was estimated with operational business 
performance measures. Those included sales conversion rate (SCR), retention save rate 
(RSR), and dormancy prevention rate (DPR), among others. Consider the case of sales 
conversion, SCR. Because the company was assessed as being in the “intermediate” 
level for “proﬁling and segmentation” and in the “foundation” level for “critical event 
management,” potential improvement in the SCR is estimated to be in the 50 percent 
to 100 percent range. The 50 percent lower bound is the potential improvement yielded 
by moving from the “foundation” level to the “intermediate” level on “critical event 
management.” The 100 percent upper bound is the potential improvement yielded by 
moving from the “intermediate” level to the “advanced” level on “proﬁling and seg-
mentation.” With SCR having a 50 to 100 percent improvement range, and assuming a 
normal distribution with a mean of 75 percent, the implied volatility of CRM beneﬁts 
due only to an uncertain improvement in SCR is 33 percent. It also is possible to esti-
mate the variability of potential improvements on all relevant operational performance 
measures (RSR, DPR, etc.). We estimated σ
j
DMC using a Monte Carlo simulation that 
assumes a linear and additive relationship over all factors inﬂuencing CRM payoffs. The 
weighting of operational performance measures is relative to the ﬁnancial impact that 
a 1 percent improvement in each measure would have on CRM payoffs. For example, 
to calculate the ﬁnancial impact of a 1 percent operational improvement in SCR, we 
can use the number of new annual conversions, the net annual dollar contributions per 
converted lead, and the number of times customers are contacted in a year.
Evaluation Results
Figure 6 summarizes the valuation results for 15 data mart consolidation conﬁgura-
tions, denoted C1 to C15. The base case conﬁgurations are labeled C1/B1, C4/B1′, 
C8/B2, and C10/B2′. C13 has the highest active NPV, so its staged implementation 
strategy is best for managing risk.
C1 to C7 have low valuations because they involve only rehosting and the CRM 
beneﬁts are low without rearchitecting. Yet real OBRiM still adds value, especially in 
C5. But notice that compared to C1/B1, which has no embedded real options, C2 and 
C3 have a lower passive NPV. This is because staging and piloting increase the cost 
of rehosting, but their risk management approach adds real option value that increases 
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active NPV. Piloting is more beneﬁcial than staging because it does not increase the 
cost of rehosting by as much. Compared to C4/B1′, which has no embedded real op-
tions, CRM deployment in C5–C7 is contingent on the success of rehosting. This adds 
a small option premium that makes C5–C7’s active NPV even higher. Interestingly, 
although C6 and C7 use staging and piloting options to manage risk, their active 
NPV is lower than C5’s. They both postpone the data mart consolidation savings 
and increase the cost of rehosting by more than the value that their real options add. 
Why? Because the real options involved resolve only one risk in CRM implementa-
tion—data source quality.
Conﬁgurations C8–C15 also involve rearchitecting, but only C10–C15 have much 
higher valuations because they consider deployment of an integrated analytic CRM. 
C10/B2′ has a much higher value than C8/B2 and C9, for example. (Conﬁgurations 
C8/B2 and C9 have the same passive NPV: they rearchitect data mart clusters in the 
same order, but C9 permits staged commitment.) Still, other conﬁgurations that use 
real options to manage risk have as much as 50 percent more value than C10/B2′. For 
example, contingent investment for CRM deployment in C11 adds option value of 
about $1.5 million. Generally, when CRM deployment is contingent on the outcome 
of rehost and rearchitect, the CRM growth option adds much more value.
Data mart consolidation, especially rearchitecting, permits resolving multiple CRM 
implementation risks. In this sense, the value of option-based risk management is 
more visible in C12, C13, C14, and C15, which also involve stagewise rehosting and 
rearchitecting with different stage sequencing. The passive NPV and active NPV for 
C14 are slightly lower than those in C12. This is another case where a higher cost 
of creating real options is due to delayed savings from consolidation, higher imple-
mentation costs, and delayed CRM improvements. C13 has a lower passive NPV 
than C12 and C14, but it has the highest active NPV. C13 leads to less cost savings 
from consolidation. Its sequence for rehosting and rearchitecting, however, permits 
resolution of the maximum CRM risk. This is also evident from the lower volatility 
of CRM beneﬁts that Monte Carlo simulations produced for C13. Its sequence also 
yields higher CRM beneﬁts due to better overall data quality. For C15, its passive 
NPV is negative because the implementation cost structure is high, and its active 
NPV is worse than even the nonstaged C11. This case contrasts with the pilot rehost 
and contingent CRM deployment in C7, which is superior to staged and nonstaged 
rehosting with contingent CRM deployment in C5 and C6.9
OBRiM: Field Study Assessment and Implications
WE NOW MOVE INTO A DISCUSSION THAT PROVIDES a critical assessment of the OBRiM 
framework based on our ﬁeld study evaluation. To balance the assessment against 
current managerial practices, we interviewed two of the data warehousing vendor’s 
senior executives about the practical value of OBRiM: Todd Walter, Chief Technical 
Ofﬁcer, and Cheik Daddah, Director of the Business Impact Modeling team.
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OBRiM’s Overall Strengths
The managers and staff in our ﬁeld study reported a successful application of OBRiM 
in their business setting, although some simplifying assumptions were made along the 
way.10 The results obtained for Global Airline show how real options can be used to 
manage risk and optimize value in the context of enterprisewide data mart consoli-
dation and enterprise data warehousing projects. Two other ﬁndings emerged. First, 
OBRiM produces investment conﬁgurations that add signiﬁcant value. As we see in 
Figure 6, C11–C15 yield dramatically higher valuations because of the ﬂexibility that 
the real options provide and the substantial CRM payoffs in a rearchitected environ-
ment; this is so especially because the real options permit resolving risks that affect 
both the rearchitecting effort and CRM deployment. Second, some of the investment 
conﬁgurations that OBRiM produces may result in loss of value. For example, con-
ﬁgurations C6 and C7 have earlier project stages that do not permit resolving sufﬁcient 
risk, in which case the cost of creating managerial ﬂexibility from using real options 
outweighs their value.
The executives found OBRiM to be logical and have four main beneﬁts—more ac-
curacy in risk analysis, greater rigor, support of proactive planning, and correspondence 
with the real-world observations:
[The OBRiM framework is] a really valuable way for us to codify what we’ve 
been trying to tell people; that there are a lot of choices and there are different 
risks, rewards, and cost components to the equation for each choice. (Todd 
Walter)
I think more importantly [one of the] lessons learned is that [OBRiM] applied a 
lot of rigor to this with real options. You’ve looked at every scenario . . . when 
it comes to consolidation, and your conclusions are in sync with what the ob-
servers in general and Teradata, in particular, are seeing out there, which gives 
a tremendous credential and credence to this approach. (Cheik Daddah)
The conceptual and technical complexity of real options analysis has been often seen 
as an obstacle to their use [44], but the interviewees suggested this was not so—at 
least in this evaluative illustration:
This approach is a good marriage of theory and practice. I really like the vari-
ous options you have deﬁned and the risk areas [you’ve identiﬁed] not just for 
enterprise data warehousing but also for consolidation. I think what’s important 
[is that] [OBRiM] simpliﬁes the complexities of options and the different strate-
gies that you can pursue, but in a clear way. (Cheik Daddah)
So what emerges is that an important strength of the OBRiM framework is its ability 
to bridge related but largely disconnected research streams on real options. One stream 
involves people trained in ﬁnance and economics, whose main focus is on technical 
aspects of valuing investments using real option models. This stream is high on rigor, 
but often does not capture the complexities and nuances of applying options to ef-
fectively represent real-world IT projects. The other stream tends to be more strategy 
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focused, and is more concerned with using the real options logic to articulate mana-
gerial heuristics and reasoning processes. This stream recognizes the complexities of 
applying real options in practice, but it typically does not offer a rigorous approach 
to ﬁnding an optimal structure for conﬁguring the various real options that could be 
embedded in projects. The airline company illustration demonstrates how OBRiM 
supports blending the strengths of both research streams in a context that reﬂects the 
real-world complexities of IT investment management.
OBRiM’s Challenges
Applying OBRiM is not without issues. Many of the challenges that we identiﬁed in 
this research also relate to common capital budgeting techniques such as NPV analy-
sis. In particular, the problems relating to risk identiﬁcation and risk estimation are 
crucial to every meaningful form of sensitivity analysis (e.g., Monte Carlo simulation), 
independent of whether OBRiM is used.
Risk Estimation
An important set of issues we faced relates to the estimation of risk factors. These 
issues link to the estimation of volatilities for real options, a task often claimed to be 
a challenge in applying the real options body of knowledge.
For the airline’s investment in data mart consolidation, we estimated the volatilities 
for real options based on the standard deviation of the logarithmic annual returns as-
sociated with outcome variables (i.e., immediate cost savings, future CRM beneﬁts) 
representing assets underlying the real options [16]. These returns are deﬁned by
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The numerator is the free cash ﬂows, FCF, in time period t + 1 plus the present value, 
PV, in period t + 1 of the cash ﬂows starting in period t + 2. The numerator changes 
as uncertain input variables representing risk factors in the underlying ﬁnancial model 
vary (see Figure 5). The denominator E(PV
t
) is the expected present value of the 
cash ﬂow starting in period t based on today’s information about the expected values 
of uncertain variables. The denominator stays the same throughout the simulation 
iterations. Monte Carlo simulations of z used @Risk software deployed on an Excel 
spreadsheet containing the ﬁnancial model, where the distributions of uncertain input 
variables were anchored in subjective estimates from the airline’s managers as well 
as in benchmark metrics from the data warehousing vendor.
This estimation approach raises several questions. In particular, why rely on subjec-
tive estimates of risk despite human cognitive biases and agency issues? And are there 
drawbacks to relying on the data warehousing ﬁrm’s benchmark metrics (e.g., using 
“customer-centricity” as a proxy for other risk factors) in this context?
Practitioners often resort to subjective risk estimates in the lack of adequate alterna-
tives. Only recently has IT research started looking at IT investment risk [13, 15] and 
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its measurement challenges (e.g., [26]). Dewan et al. explain: “There is a great need 
for . . . understanding . . . the observed risk–return proﬁle of the different classes of IT 
investment. [This] would go a long way to help executives manage their IT investment 
portfolios more effectively” [18, p. 21]. The challenge lies in developing operational 
measures for risks that can be related to IT investment returns and in having suitable 
data. Estimation of risk could be based on ﬁrm-speciﬁc data, benchmark data, or 
public market data. In this ﬁeld study, because the airline ﬁrm lacked ﬁrm-speciﬁc 
data relevant to risk estimation, we sought to lessen reliance on subjective estimates 
to the extent possible by using benchmark data about many of the data warehousing 
vendor’s clients. Considering that the ﬁrm’s staff and managers felt satisﬁed with our 
risk estimates and the valuations they enabled, our reliance on benchmark data in this 
study does not seem problematic.11
An important research issue remains open though: It is not clear what is the right 
approach to generating reliable ﬁrm-speciﬁc valuations of option-bearing investment 
structure. Is it better to use valuation models that do not impose strong assumptions on 
the contextual settings but produce valuations that hinge on subjective and possibly 
biased risk estimates? Or, is it better to rely on ﬁnancial option models that impose 
strong assumptions but can accept and work with more reliable benchmark- and 
market-driven risk estimates? The answer must consider the trade-offs between the 
two views more systematically.
Risk Identiﬁcation and Mapping to Options
A related issue pertains to limiting our risk analysis to OBRiM’s generic IT investment 
risks. We used an inﬂuence diagram to trace back from outcome variables to risk fac-
tors in OBRiM’s list. This decision-theoretic approach is typically used for base case 
analysis and sensitivity analysis. More detailed risk classiﬁcations, such as Schmidt 
et al. [39], identify over 70 different risk factors and bring up questions on granularity 
and completeness of OBRiM’s risks list. For the airline ﬁrm, using an outsourcing 
real option to control certain risks may introduce new risks, including contractual risk 
and communication risk [52]. This would require reapplying OBRiM’s steps to the 
potential risks of outsourcing, but OBRiM’s risks do not cover that.
A basic research question motivated by this is: What taxonomy of IT risks is rea-
sonably complete and at a level of granularity that is adequate for risk identiﬁcation 
and estimation? The answer must consider the risk option mappings OBRiM uses to 
prescribe which real options to embed for speciﬁc risks. If OBRiM’s list of risks is to 
be reﬁned, can its risk option mappings be made more granular? If so, how?
Designing Investment Conﬁgurations
We said earlier that one of the perceived strengths of OBRiM is that it enables managers 
to generate alternative investment structures. However, as we saw for the data mart 
consolidation project, the number of alternative investment conﬁgurations designed 
using real options may be large. A further challenge we faced—also noted by the senior 
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executives—is the effort that many conﬁgurations entails. The number of investment 
conﬁgurations can be reduced by designing hybrid conﬁgurations. For example, 
depending on what a pilot data mart consolidation effort reveals, we could proceed 
with a full-scale rehost and rearchitect effort, contract this effort to only rehosting, or 
not proceed with DMC at all. This approach produces fewer conﬁgurations, but the 
conﬁgurations are more complex to construct, explain, and evaluate.12
We chose to look only at simple conﬁgurations that are easy to design, comprehend, 
and evaluate. For this approach to work well, it would be ideal to develop decision 
support tools that can assist in screening out inferior conﬁgurations, computing op-
tion values, and so on. Such tools would require automating some technical details 
of OBRiM and developing heuristics for picking promising conﬁgurations. Still the 
basic questions remaining are two: How do we go about reducing complexity due to 
a multitude of alternative investment conﬁgurations? And, are managers better off 
generating on their own alternatives they ﬁnd most deserving of their attention? The 
answer requires empirical consideration of decision makers’ preferences, cognitive 
biases and limitations, and prior experience with real options [25, 41].
A related issue is the feasibility of conducting sensitivity analysis. We were hoping 
to provide managers with sensitivity analysis information that would enable them to 
see the effect of option-bearing investment structures on the ability to control risk. 
However, this turned out to be infeasible with Monte Carlo simulations. A difﬁculty 
is the need for nested simulation runs—an inner one for estimating volatilities for 
embedded options, and an outer one for estimating the probability distribution of the 
active NPV. Current software tools such as @Risk do not support nested simulations. 
Hence, the following open question emerged from our study: What is a good approach 
for conducting sensitivity analysis for investment structures that embed complex 
combinations of real options?
Growth Options and Soft Beneﬁts
Research studying the business impact of IT investment has shown the importance of 
growth options [19, 38]. OBRiM and real options analysis call for the identiﬁcation 
and valuation of growth options [17]. Still, an important question is: Which growth 
options should be considered when looking at an IT investment opportunity?
The relevance of this question is apparent in the data mart consolidation project. 
The airline managers in our ﬁeld study site identiﬁed CRM deployment as the only 
plausible follow-up investment. It overlooked other enterprise data warehouse–enabled 
opportunities such as supply-chain optimization and business intelligence. The decision 
to consider only CRM was inﬂuenced by the airline’s focus on CRM and, we suspect, 
by the data warehousing ﬁrm being cautious not to oversell the business value of an 
enterprise data warehouse in terms of growth options. Of course, the risk of taking 
too cautious an approach is one of undervaluation and underinvestment.
This leaves us with the question: What is an adequate approach to determining 
which growth options to consider for a speciﬁc IT investment? It is interesting to 
mention an approach that was used in the past. Research applying real option analysis 
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in one pharmaceutical company has found, based on documentation of past R&D 
projects, that each project has, on average, spawned nearly two follow-on investment 
opportunities that were eventually pursued [35]. How applicable is this approach to 
IT investments? Can we develop benchmarks for different types of IT investments, 
organizations, or industries?
Interpretation and Action on OBRiM Results
Interpreting the results of OBRiM and deciding how to act on them is another issue that 
needs to be given closer attention. The challenge is when two not necessarily compat-
ible perspectives are involved, as in the case of outsourcing. From the perspective of 
the airline ﬁrm, since one conﬁguration (C13) is best to pursue, it should structure a 
ﬂexible outsourcing contract that embeds contingencies for breaking the contract in 
midstream. If the airline chooses to pursue a staged strategy, the data warehousing 
vendor should require provisions in the outsourcing contract to reﬂect possible contact 
cancellation in midstream. For example, the vendor ﬁrm might prefer a risk-sharing, 
value-based contract to extract a higher fraction of returns from the airline. The reality 
though is that few client ﬁrms would agree to a value-based contract, although some 
research is already noting the plausibility of this [34].
In this light, a remaining challenge for the data warehousing vendor and the airline 
ﬁrm is how to use the OBRiM results to reach a value split that is fair to both. Irrespec-
tive of which data mart consolidation project conﬁguration the airline decides to pursue 
and how the outsourcing contact is structured, the project would have to be reevaluated 
after each stage is completed. Then, depending on how much risk a completed stage 
resolves, the airline ﬁrm still would need to decide which real option(s) to exercise. It 
may also be necessary to determine how to readjust its data mart consolidation invest-
ment conﬁguration over time.
This brings up the issue of exercising real options. The relevance of this is apparent 
from another comment offered by one of the senior executives we interviewed:
Many managers build decision points into their projects, but I see way too 
many who get to the place where they should cancel the project [e.g., exercise 
an abandonment option] but don’t. If you have a tool like [OBRiM] that shows 
the long-term cost, and the long-term downside risk of not taking the option, 
then I think that has a lot of value. (Todd Walter)
Other research suggests that organizational and cultural biases can cause managers 
not to exercise real options when it is necessary to exercise them [21, 29]. The inﬂu-
ence of such biases can be greatly reduced if managers see the cost of not exercising 
real options from a rational economic perspective. Although OBRiM does show the 
value that real options add if they are exercised when appropriate, it does not explicitly 
show the monetary consequences of not exercising these options when warranted. 
This opportunity cost of inaction needs to be explored further.
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OBRiM Adoption Challenges
The challenges discussed above suggest some of the complexities that could impact 
OBRiM adoption by organizations. This concern was expressed by the senior execu-
tives we interviewed:
It’s all about the maturity of the organization. . . . If you don’t have people in 
the organization that can lay out the decision trees and do the ﬁnancial analysis, 
then none of this works. There are still way too many organizations out there 
that don’t have the maturity to do this. (Todd Walter)
As far as implementing this [OBRiM] in front of customers, I can tell you that 
probably there may be one or two customers who have people who are not only 
exceptionally bright but who have done some digging into this and could poten-
tially see value in the quantiﬁcation piece. I think there are certain pockets within 
certain organizations that this approach would have a more ﬁnancial ﬁt; if you 
look at banking, or the risk area in banking, because they use futures and options 
and they could look at stochastic and non-stochastic models et cetera for their 
data business, for example. The other area I could see is manufacturing where 
they have done a lot of six sigma-type implementations. (Cheik Daddah)
Two additional recommendations surfaced from the interviews for increasing the 
acceptance of OBRiM. One is clear: improving the training of IT decision makers in 
ﬁnancial concepts is critically important. As managers develop a better understanding 
of, and gain more experience with, real options, OBRiM will become more useful to 
them. A similar recommendation came from a recent study on factors affecting the 
successful adoption of IT portfolio management practices [27]. The study found that 46 
percent of 179 senior IT executives surveyed agreed that their IT staff members lacked 
working knowledge of important concepts from ﬁnance. Another recommendation 
is that OBRiM needs to be made more cost-effective in terms of its application time 
and the associated effort. Research on the challenges we discussed would go a long 
way toward developing methodological and decision support aids that could greatly 
simplify the use of OBRiM.
In summary, weighing OBRiM’s strengths against its weaknesses, the OBRiM 
framework appears to be a valuable tool that has the potential to help managers to 
systematically structure large enterprise investments for the purpose of balancing 
risk and return:
Any tools we can get that keep people focused on the long-term strategic value 
are good tools. Where I think [OBRiM] ﬁts is that it allows people to look at 
that long-term strategic value and be able to quantify and even feel that they 
can control the risk, which, in many cases, seems or feels overwhelming. (Todd 
Walter)
OBRiM’s application is not limited to the evaluation-focused illustrative setting that 
we have discussed. Instead, its use can favorably impact the risk and return balance 
for any large IT investment. With this said, we have identiﬁed several areas where 
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additional research is needed to make OBRiM, or a simpliﬁed version of it, more us-
able and useful to managers in ﬁrm-speciﬁc settings. We encourage others to join us 
in gaining more experience in applying OBRiM to other settings, so we can become 
more conﬁdent in making broader assertions about the extent of it managerial usability 
and value in practice.
Conclusions
OPTIMIZING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RISK AND VALUE, and taking into account the cost of 
creating real options in sequential IT investments, requires innovations for structur-
ing a meaningful and implementable analysis for senior managers. In this paper, we 
discussed and evaluated the application of theory and methods related to OBRiM, 
an option-based risk management framework [6]. This framework helps a decision 
maker to systematically identify the real options to embed in an IT investment in order 
to manage risk. It recognizes the difference between those options that are explicitly 
purchased (e.g., building a prototype) and those that are implicitly held (e.g., deferring 
investment). OBRiM also emphasizes an analytical process that is focused on assessing 
the active NPV of a project, based on the application of various ﬁnancial models and 
methods to evaluate alternative conﬁgurations of IT investments. OBRiM’s IT invest-
ment evaluation thinking draws upon new ideas from corporate ﬁnance and ﬁnancial 
economics that are of increasing interest to IS researchers and industry practitioners. 
It also supplements existing approaches in the IS literature [13, 17, 20, 21, 27, 30] by 
further emphasizing the roles of systematic identiﬁcation of real options, risk estima-
tion, sensitivity analysis, and valuation, and the interplay between passive NPV and 
active NPV in technology investment settings. In addition to the application of real 
options models, the primary vehicle for the development of the results in this research 
is Monte Carlo simulation. It is applied for alternative IT investment conﬁgurations 
that OBRiM helps an analyst to identify.
This research applies a ﬁeld study methodology. This involved primary data collec-
tion and interviews of senior managers at two organizations. The purpose of pursuing 
research in this particular context was that we believed it would be appropriate for 
assessing our new methodology for the management of sequential investments in IT. 
The context was a large-scale data mart consolidation project that was being evaluated 
by an airline ﬁrm, relative to the technical services offered by a data warehousing 
systems solution vendor. The methodology blends the technical aspects of valuing 
investments using real option models with a more strategy-focused perspective. It also 
provides a means to ﬁnd an optimal structure for conﬁguring the various real options 
that could be embedded in projects. We applied OBRiM to identify several speciﬁc 
classes of real options, including the implicit options of deferral and abandonment, 
and the explicit options of piloting and staging. The approach proved to be useful 
and revealing for staff members at the ﬁeld study sites who were studying how to 
achieve an optimal conﬁguration for their data mart consolidation project so that it 
would embed the most value-bearing real options.
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The primary ﬁndings from this research are in three areas. First, there is signiﬁcant 
value in the managerial analysis of IT investment projects for which it is possible to 
simultaneously evaluate alternative conﬁgurations of the sequential investments that 
are involved, as a means to optimize the sequence and to drive active NPV to its high-
est level. This corroborates the recent ﬁndings of Bardhan et al. [5], who pioneered 
an IT investment portfolio evaluation approach that also aids in identifying how IT 
investment sequences should be structured so as to maximize portfolio value. Second, 
the application of Monte Carlo analysis is of particular beneﬁt to managers in develop-
ing intuition about the business value of the alternative structures for option-bearing 
sequential IT investments. Future research can explore the further use of Monte Carlo 
simulations to enable decision makers to see the impact of using real options on the 
distribution of active NPV.
Third, we also have learned that OBRiM is viewed by managers, on the whole, as 
a valuable aid in their decision-making process. Although there are still issues with 
the large number of real options and investment structures that the analysis generates, 
the sense that we heard expressed was that the systematic approach that OBRiM uses 
was beneﬁcial nevertheless. Our work contrasts with the work of Clemons and Gu 
[13] in that they focus on call-type options that create strategic ﬂexibility, whereas 
OBRiM is more concerned with using put-type options to create operational ﬂexibility. 
The IT investment assessment process that we studied has greater complexity than 
what is normally discussed in textbooks on capital budgeting. This complexity is due 
to the need to evaluate different investment structures that permit future contingent 
investments, real option–based commitment adjustments, and the management of the 
project’s value trajectory over time, as new information is received.
In closing, we believe that the methodology we have evaluated complements tech-
niques and evaluative perspectives that already exist in the literature, including scenario 
analysis, structured NPV approaches, decision trees, and sequential decision analysis 
and dynamic programming. Our emphasis on the contrast between the estimation 
values of passive NPV and real option–driven active NPV—and our consideration of 
the range of alternative conﬁgurations of the IT investment structure—constitutes a 
unique perspective that deserves additional effort for further development.
In spite of these contributions, the reader should recognize that there still are limi-
tations. Our ﬁeld study interviews identiﬁed several appropriate areas for additional 
development effort to be made. They include addressing the reliance on subjective 
estimates of risk to characterize the real options associated with a strategic IT invest-
ment; ﬁnding a means, as with other ﬁnancial economics and risk management evalu-
ation techniques such as value-at-risk and RiskMetrics, to obtain reliable market data 
that might become recognized as widely accepted benchmarks for IT investment risk; 
further validating the appropriateness of OBRiM’s current risk categories for which 
real options can be mapped in the analysis; and further addressing issues surrounding 
the identiﬁcation and calibration of growth options and soft beneﬁts.
Another recurring issue, and one that we have seen in other interorganizational IT 
investment settings, involves how the beneﬁts are split between the partners in the 
kinds of partnered IT investments and evaluation settings we see here. The difﬁculty 
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arises with the noncontractibility of the outcomes in terms of how value is to be 
shared. This is the well-known incomplete contracts problem that has been treated in 
the IS literature by Clemons et al. [15] in buyer–supplier procurement settings, and 
by Han et al. [23] for ﬁnancial risk management systems investments. This additional 
risk suggests that, in the presence of uncertainty about the split of value from the 
outcomes of large-scale IT investments, both the IT services and systems vendor and 
the investing ﬁrm are likely to underinvest relative to the level that would be observed 
for an integrated ﬁrm. This further suggests the need for future research that examines 
strategic IT investment evaluation in terms of the associated incentives for effort and 
information sharing to achieve optimal commitment levels.
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NOTES
1. Throughout this paper, we refer to the word option in two different senses—a distinction 
that will help this research to connect more effectively to the strategy and ﬁnancial economics 
literatures on sequential technology investments. One use is in the real option sense of buying 
a right or purchasing something to be able to take a value-bearing action in the future that may 
not be possible otherwise. Clemons and Gu’s [13] interpretation related to this is that invest-
ments can be made to preserve ﬂexibility and to accelerate subsequent choices, without requir-
ing an expensive full commitment. They aptly characterize this kind of real option-bearing IT 
investment as a strategy-enabling partial investment, and further recognize that such partial 
investments cost less than fully acquiring the necessary resources. The authors further comment: 
“Importantly, [partial investments] enable speed of action when the appropriate course of action 
can be determined and they allow delaying full spending on necessary investments until it is 
clear which investments are required. When future conditions become known and requirements 
become clear, contingent IT investments can . . . be made. Thus, the initial investments are 
properly viewed as strategic options, while completing the future contingent investments can 
best be seen as exercising the strategic options created by initial investments” [13, p. 14]. The 
second use of the term option is in the sense of things that managers can decide to do that do 
not require any initial purchases or decisions. They are simply available in the normal course 
of managerial decision making in response to changing environmental information (e.g., wait-
ing to ﬁnance and start up a new project due to expectations of lower future interest rates, or 
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abandoning a pilot project whose resulting software application has gotten out of sync with the 
market’s functionality requirements).
2. A data mart is a collection of databases built to help managers make strategic decisions 
about their businesses. In contrast, a data warehouse combines enterprisewide databases. Data 
marts are usually smaller and are associated with a speciﬁc business function or process. For 
example, a customer service department may collect customer service and complaints data, 
while the ﬁrm’s product Web site may record click-stream data on what products customers 
viewed.
3. Teradata is a division of NCR and a provider of enterprise data warehousing and integrated 
analytic CRM infrastructure solutions and IT services.
4. Although some may view our approach as action research, in which the authors drove the 
outcomes as evaluation project participants, this was not the case. This research was undertaken 
as ﬁeld study research involving retrospective analysis, as we have seen in the prior published 
works of Bardhan et al. [5], Benaroch and Kauffman [7, 8], Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza 
[40], Taudes et al. [45], and others. The goal was to evaluate outcomes that have been observed 
involving past actions and managerial decisions, and then structuring evaluation approaches 
around them to see how the outcomes may have been best understood to shed light on the theories 
and methods that have been applied. We see such retrospective evaluative approaches in the 
case study research of Han et al. [23] with explanatory economic modeling, Hess and Kemerer 
[24] with theory-testing industry-level evaluation, Clemons et al. [15] with interorganizational 
analysis of buyer–supplier risks, and Wigand et al. [51] with the analysis of standards in the 
home mortgage industry.
5. We will not fully treat the criticism that real options analysis with ﬁnancial models cannot 
produce ﬁrm-speciﬁc valuations. As with any methodology or theory, there are issues that arise 
in application. Sometimes progress comes from stretching the bounds of existing applications 
as a means to free up our thinking for next-step innovations. We nevertheless should point out 
that the essence of useful ﬁnancial evaluation in managerial and strategy contexts is to assist 
decision making by means that seem appropriate. Clemons [12] has argued that approximation, 
order of magnitude valuation, and the identiﬁcation of the most critical strategic options avail-
able to a ﬁrm often surpass the usefulness of technically correct estimates of value.
6. Passive NPV is the traditional NPV without consideration given to real options and 
ﬂexibility. Active NPV is passive NPV + real option value that arises from a ﬁrm’s operating 
and strategic options. For additional discussion of passive and active NPV, see Benaroch [6], 
Benaroch and Kauffman [7], and Trigeorgis [46].
7. This echoes comments from Clemons and Gu, who state that senior managers are “con-
cerned with avoiding any unnecessary investments in technology infrastructure in support of 
market opportunities that do not arise. They are trading off the desire for speed (‘we have no 
time to waste’) with the desire for certainty before acting (‘we have no resources to waste’). 
This requires a methodology for justifying investments in assets that will be required only under 
speciﬁc sets of conditions, and for enabling rapid deployment of these assets when they are 
required” [13, p. 12]. The authors aptly call these contingent investments.
8. We thank an anonymous reviewer who pointed out that this is not generally the case, 
which we agree is true. With the passage of time, ﬁrms become more informed of the value of 
data warehousing, of the installation cost of the data warehouse systems, and of the potential 
future revenues due to CRM integration. This suggests deferral could have signiﬁcant value. 
We have qualiﬁed our statement here, in keeping with assertions of the data warehouse system 
vendor’s staff about what they believed were the situational conditions present in the project 
investment environment.
9. We must note that these results may not be interpreted the same way when viewed from 
the conﬂicting perspectives of the outsourcing vendor and the purchaser of IT services. The 
revenues of one are the costs of the other.
10. Recall our earlier clariﬁcation about the decision to assume that the real option to defer 
the data mart consolidation project or one of its parts was viewed as not being viable. This is 
a simplifying assumption that could be relaxed in additional analysis. According to real option 
theory applied to project valuation, any additional ﬂexibilities and strategic choices that can 
be made available will only serve to increase the expanded NPV.
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11. Early in the study, we also considered using other methods involving market data. A 
recent study shows how market data can be used to estimate certain IT investment risks using 
a multifactor investment model and the event study methodology [2]. However, it was not clear 
if such sophisticated methods are needed or even adequate.
12. A direction worth exploring is the use of dynamic programming to ﬁnd the best investment 
conﬁguration enabled by a given set of options. A similar approach for smaller-scale problems 
is by Wang and de Neufville [47].
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Appendix: Data Mart Consolidation
Data Mart Proliferation
A COMMON PROBLEM WITHIN LARGE ENTERPRISES is the proliferation of data marts. If 
each interaction with a customer is logged in a separate data mart, for example, it is 
not possible to create a single view of the customer. A solution to this problem is to 
undertake a data mart consolidation (DMC) project. This usually produces a single 
enterprise data warehouse, an integrated and centralized repository of comprehensive 
and detailed historical data that supports multiple decision-making applications and 
user groups.
A Data Mart Consolidation Project
Figure A1 is a high-level schematic of a DMC project for ﬁve data marts. (The estimated 
costs and time durations are presented only for illustrative purposes and the choice of 
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ﬁve data marts is arbitrary.) The project includes two main phases—rehosting and/or 
rearchitecting. Rehosting involves data capture and planning, then physical migration 
of the data, tables, and processes into the enterprise data warehouse, followed by a 
test and validation process. Rearchitecting involves the design of an integrated data 
model, the reengineering and update of data, and extensive testing of the resulting 
enterprise data warehouse. This phase can yield signiﬁcant performance improvements 
by enabling a ﬁrm to harness the full value of integrated business data. Compared 
with rehosting alone, however, rearchitecting makes a DMC project more risky and 
adds 60–75 percent more time and cost [42, 43].
Data Mart Consolidation Beneﬁts and Risks
Consolidating data marts into an enterprise data warehouse can offer signiﬁcant ben-
eﬁts, but is subject to risk [37, 53]. Beneﬁts range from immediate cost savings, to 
improved data analysis capabilities for day-to-day operations, to long-term follow-up 
Figure A1. Data Mart Consolidation Projects
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investment opportunities. Risks are attributed to business and organizational factors 
(e.g., management support, organizational politics, end-user involvement) as well as 
technical and technology factors (e.g., quality of data and systems, skills, tech maturity, 
and scalability).
Data Mart Implementation Outsourcing
Due to lack of experience, many organizations outsource their DMC implementations 
to an enterprise data warehouse vendor. Outsourcing the rehosting effort transfers to 
the vendor much of the technology and technical risk associated with the development 
team’s skills and experience, development tools and processes, and adequacy of the 
technology platform. Outsourcing the rearchitecting effort lowers uncertainty over the 
user involvement needed to achieve an understanding of multiple database structures, 
formats, and platforms prior to the creation of an integrated data model. For many 
ﬁrms, 70–85 percent of the uniﬁed data model may come from industry models that 
enterprise data warehouse vendors have developed.
Actively Managing Data Mart Outsourcing Risk
Even if a DMC project is outsourced, the ability to manage risk is crucial, considering 
that DMC can cost from a few million dollars to several tens of millions. The chal-
lenge is threefold. First, it is difﬁcult to balance trade-offs among the risks, costs, and 
potential beneﬁts of a DMC project. The greater the scope of the project, the harder it 
is to manage the trade-offs. Second, some beneﬁts are hard to quantify, especially for 
indirect payoffs from follow-up investments. Third, DMC projects are often structured 
on the basis of rules of thumb, not economic principles. One heuristic is to stage DMC 
for proof of concept to justify larger-scale investments.
Identifying Optimal Data Mart Consolidation  
Project Conﬁgurations
A consequence of these challenges is a dilemma that many organizations face: deﬁning 
the scope of a DMC project. There could be many project conﬁgurations for deﬁn-
ing the DMC scope. For example, the simplest is to rehost all data marts together. A 
little more complex approach is to rehost and rearchitect all data marts together. Still 
another level of complexity involves rehosting and rearchitecting several data marts 
at a time. An even higher level of complexity occurs with rehosting and rearchitecting 
data marts, and then following up with an investment in an integrated CRM solution. 
Even if the simplest conﬁguration leads to a positive net ﬁnancial outcome, more 
complex conﬁgurations may lead to better results. This is important considering that 
organizations are less and less open to accepting IT savings alone as a justiﬁcation for 
a large DMC investment. They expect a DMC investment to ﬁx a business problem. 
A fundamental economic question that many organizations face is: How to ﬁnd an 
optimal DMC project conﬁguration?
